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TIME CONTROLS ON LAND USE:
PROPHYLACTIC LAW FOR PLANNERS
Editor's Note: While this Note was in publication, the New York
Court of Appeals decided Golden v. Planning Board.* The court up-
held the Ramapo scheme of controlled growth, stating, "[Wihere it is
clear that the existing physical and financial resources of the commu-
nity are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities which
a substantial increase in population requires, there is a rational basis
for 'phased growth .... " Judicial sanction of this mode of control-
ling the rate of community growth will have a significant impact on
future suburban planning and on the delicate balance of competing
interests discussed in this Note.
The sprawling megalopolis of the eastern seaboard felt the impact
of exclusionary zoning1 first; other metropolitan areas will experience
it as their protective time-lag dissolves. Judicial and social reaction to
this issue promises to alter dramatically and perhaps indirectly to con-
sume traditional zoning practices.
Caught between the pressures of increasingly successful attacks on
zoning schemes which create barriers to migration 2 and the burdens
that massive urban exodus has placed upon municipal public services,
No. 475 (N.Y. Ct. App., May 3, 1972).
** Id. at 18.
1 This term has come to signify the general problem created by local zoning
ordinances that render suburban housing costs so prohibitively high that low- and
moderate-income families cannot afford to buy.
It has been clear for some time that the principal direct public controls over
land use (zoning, subdivision control, etc.) are often employed to exclude large
groups of people from access to good residential areas, on racial and/or on
economic grounds.
Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New
Jersey, 22 SvA.cusE L. Rav. 475 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Williams & Norman], See
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 NJ. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353
(L. Div. 1971); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107
S.E.2d 390 (1959); Babcock 8c Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111
U. PA. L. Rav. 1040 (1963); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Strong, Girsh and Kit-Mar:-4n,
U ut. E _.uin_Husig,_22-ZoNiwkmLGrsr 100a (1970y; Sysr<
posium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRAcusE L. RaV. 465 (1971); Symposium: Land Planning
in a Democracy, 20 LAw & CoNrrEmp. PROB. 197 (1955); Note, Suburban Zoning Ordinances
and Building Codes: Their Effect on Low and Moderate Income Housing, 45 NoTRE DAmE
LAw. 123 (1969). See also Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh
Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); note 43 and accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 27-37 and accompanying text infra.
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suburban planning boards must revise traditional attitudes and tech-
niques. One solution that accommodates both the traditional interests
of planning boards and the demands of outsiders for suburban access
features a time controlled, sequential development of the community.
I
TiA DILEMMA
A. Halcyon Days of Old: The Reign of the Planning Board
Planning boards have largely had their way in the courts since the
1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.8 firmly established
the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning.4 At the time it was
decided Euclid was an important boost for the embryonic community
planning movement, and it continues to be the lodestar guiding both
planners and courts.
Since 19285 the Supreme Court has refused to hear any zoning
cases, preferring to leave the task of judicial scrutiny to the states. By
heavily embellishing the zoning scheme sanctioned in Euclid with a
variety of other devices, many having an exclusionary effect,6 planning
boards have evidently interpreted the Court's reluctance to review
zoning cases as tacit approval of their practices. 7 Generally, the judi-
3 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid has been called "the 'open sesame' of land-use planning
in this country." Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELT.L L. REV. 1, 11 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Roberts].
4 See R. ANDERSON, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE IN NEv YoRE STATE § 2.05 (1963);
C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN MUNICIPAL ZONING 63-64 (1969):
The field of zoning is one in which the experts have become very powerful. In
most communities the legislative body will not make changes in the zoning
ordinance or map without first consulting the planning commission....
S. . I]he planners have [also] gained a considerable amount of judicial
respect, and zoning actions ... have often been upheld with little more than the
observation that they were in accordance with professional planning advice.
5 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), was the second and the last
zoning case decided by the Supreme Court.
6 For a catalog of major exclusionary zoning devices, see Williams & Norman 481-84.
7 Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Euclid on topics related to zoning seem to
confirm the Court's policy of allowing considerable local discretion in land-use planning.
See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding provision of state constitution
requiring local voters to approve site of low-income housing); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954y (recognizing condemnation power for aesthetic reasons). One commentator reviling
at Valtierra felt that the Court might be a bit rusty at handling zoning law. He found
"a Supreme Court remarkably unsophisticated in the devious jungle of local government, a
Court that had barely brushed against a building code or zoning ordinance since the
1920's and had little familiarity with this entire sphere of law." Bosselman, Commentary
on James v. Valtierra, 23 ZONING DIGEST 117, 118 (1971).
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ciary has been favorable to these innovations.8 Citizens for the most part
have been equally receptive to planner intervention, their communities
having suffered long enough from the effects of chaotic growth pro-
duced by laissez-faire land use.9
Planners developed an arsenal of zoning weapons to use in the
battle against haphazard growth and in pursuit of the time-honored
rubric of "orderly community development." Following the lead of
Euclid,0 courts relied heavily on the presumption of validity to sus-
tain zoning devices." General welfare for zoning purposes, however,
was equated with individual municipality welfare;' 2 little consider-
ation was directed beyond the town limits.
One by one the principal exclusionary zoning techniques 3 were
8 For judicial treatment of these practices, see notes 14-16 and accompanying text infra.
One commentator suggests that "courts, at least the appellate courts, genuinely dislike
zoning litigation." R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAmE: MuNIcIPAL PRACTICFS AND POLICIES 101
(1966). See Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zon-
ing: From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. Rv. 507, 513 (1971).
9 A. RATuoPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1, at 1-3 (3d ed. 1969). In
American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 32, 105 N.E.2d 803 (1952), the court
explained why early zoning efforts were so well received:
Zoning was one of the most radical departures from the traditional concepts of
private property in our time .... The need for it was nevertheless so great that
all, conservative, liberal, and progressive alike, have accepted it and it has not
been subjected to the vehement attack made on other measures deemed "liberal"
or "progressive."
Id. at 38, 105 N.E.2d at 805.
10 "If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debat-
able, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (emphasis added).
11 E.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 242, 181 A.2d 129, 134 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963), where the court stated: "[T]he plaintiff to prevail must show
beyond debate that the Township in adopting the challenged amendment transgressed the
standards of [the New Jersey Zoning Enabling Act]." See Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71, 141 A.2d 851, 856 (1958); Note, Legitimate
Use Exclusions Through Zoning: Applying a Balancing Test, 57 CoRNELL L. REv. 461, 462-
63 (1972).
12 See, e.g., Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62,
68, 141 A.2d 851, 854-55 (1958): "It is plain enough that zoning restrictions in one township
cannot be permitted to control or impinge upon the zoning regulations which a contiguous
township may see fit to adopt."
13 The primary motivation behind exclusionary zoning devices is financial. Many
communities desire to "keep out the lower income groups ...which require significant
public expenditures" and which contribute little to municipal revenues. "Looking at the
matter in pocketbook terms, [local citizens commonly] support fiscal zoning. Usually
nobody bothers to ask where the families who are being excluded should live." NATIONAL
COMW'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 19 (1969). However, as "in-
creasing numbers of jobs are being located in the suburbs, where they are less accessible to
central city residents" (id. at 47), exclusionary zoning devices may have an adverse economic
impact on some communities.
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upheld under the permissive Euclid rationale: minimum lot size re-
quirements were sanctioned almost universally; 14 minimum floor space
requirements enjoyed judicial endorsement; 15 and the direct or indirect
exclusion of multiple dwellings became an integral part of the plan-
ners' panoply of tools.16
B. The Bubble Bursts: A Clamor To "Open up the Suburbs"
With the recent and phenomenal out-migration from American
cities,17 acute housing shortages have developed'8 and suburban land
14 E.g., Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959); Simon v. Town
of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11
N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). But see Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich.
331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951) (rights of private property owner favored over community
interest in three-acre minimum lot size).
15 E.g., DeMars v. Zoning Comm'n, 142 Conn. 580, 115 A.2d 653 (1955); Dundee Realty
Co. v. Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of
Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); see Flower
Hill Bldg. Corp. v. Flower Hill, 199 Misc. 344, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. 1950). But see
Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Township of Waterford, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N.W.2d 788 (1947)
(minimum floor area for aesthetic purposes held invalid).
16 E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (ordinance ex-
cluding apartment houses held constitutional); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal.
477, 234 P. 381 (1925) (upholding ordinance prohibiting buildings housing more than two
families); Minkus v. Pond, 236 Ill. 467, 158 N.E. 121 (1927) (upholding refusal to allow
apartments in a single family residence area); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E.
120 (1925) (upholding ordinance excluding large apartment houses from residential dis-
tricts); see Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955) (single family
use restrictions upheld). Limiting residential development to single family houses has its
most direct impact on low- and moderate-income groups.
Multifamily housing units generally provide the best opportunities for
housing persons of low and moderate incomes. The rental nature of such hous-
ing, and the savings produced by spreading land costs over a great number of
units, place such housing within the means of many who could not afford new
single-family houses. Furthermore, many of the publicly assisted housing programs
are multifamily programs and depend on the existence of zoning for multifamily
structures.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 13, at 215. See also Babcock & Bossel-
man, supra note 1, at 1060.
17 In 1950, 52 million persons lived in the central cities . . . . constituting 59
percent of the SMSA [Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area] population ...
[T]he 58 million central city residents of 1960 central cities constituted only 51
percent of the total metropolitan population....
Between 1960 and 1985, the projections indicate that while SMSA populations
in the nation as a whole would increase by about 58 percent, the population in
central cities would increase by only 13 percent whereas that in suburbia, the
ring, would more than double. The population in nonmetropolitan areas would
grow at almost the same level as that in central cities, some 12 percent.
P. HODGE & P. HAUSER, THE CHALLENGE OF AMERICA's METROPOLITAN POPULATION OUTLOOK,
1960 To 1985, at 13-15 (1968).
18 The tight housing market is basically a product of two interrelated phenomena.
First, the rate by which construction exceeds removals is declining:
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has become the subject of a tug-of-war.19 An unlikely alliance of private
developers and outsiders has emerged to challenge exclusionary zoning
devices as erecting unreasonable obstacles to the solution of housing
problems.20 This alliance seeks to change the face of suburbia by con-
structing high-density,21 high-profit22 apartment houses and small lot
subdivisions.
Outsider groups and concerned observers charge that parochial
private property interests, not the interests of the general public, are
being protected in the name of the police power23 and that zoning
controls have been employed to achieve racial and economic segrega-
tion.24 They demand an end to practices that render suburban living
an exclusive privilege of monied classes; 25 the goal is to make the
The net increase of 10.4 million units in the housing inventory in the decade of
the sixties was less than in the fifties, primarily due to an increased pace of
removals of units from the supply. The number of removals is expected to be
even greater during the seventies ....
SUBCO M. ON HOusING PANELS OF HousE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, 92D CONG., 1sT
SEss., HOUSING PRODUCTION, HOUSING DasrAND, AND DEVELOPING A SUITABLE LIVING ENVIRON-
ENr, pt. 1, at 2 (Comm. Print 1971). Secondly, production of new single family housing
is also declining. Id. at 40. Only production of multi-family rental units has remained
relatively stable, apparently because of the availability of financing: "Many lenders have
favored rental housing mortgage financing over single-family home financing during the
tight money period because they have been able to obtain an equity interest in the property
as a condition of making the mortgage loan." Id. at 42.
The net result of this squeeze is that vacancy rates have diminished nearly to the
vanishing point in some metropolitan areas (id. at 23) and the housing that is available
is very expensive (id. at 2). According to Babcock and Bosselman, the migration of many
American industries to suburban areas encourages a similar migration by their employees
who, unable to afford expensive housing, "will look for suburban multiple-family housing."
Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 1, at 1058.
19 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1971, at 1, col. 2:
Land is the coin and the treasure of the suburbs around New York City and that
land-some of which has risen in value in 20 years from $700 to $90,000 an acre
-is the prize in a continuing battle for control of the 775 municipalities that
make up the world's largest suburban area.
20 See Roberts 22.
21 See Comment, supra note 8, at 508.
22 An area of reasonable size (say less than half of a town) can be zoned for one
acre (or for that matter for three or five acres) without having a serious impact
on the cost of housing for people in the rest of the town. It does of course have
a serious impact on the profits of developers and landowners; and it is for this
reason that the home builders are leading a campaign against large-lot zoning
as the exclusionary device. Their motivation is obvious; if required lot sizes can
be sharply reduced, they can often sell the smaller lots for almost as much as
larger lots, and thus receive a fine windfall-but with no benefit to those seeking
inexpensive housing. Whether public-spirited liberals should join in this cam-
paign is another question.
Williams & Norman 497 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
23 See, e.g., Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land
Use Controls, 22 SY AcusE L. REy. 509, 522 (1971).
24 See Williams & Norman 475; notes 40 & 47 infra.
25 "Of greatest urgency is ending the use of the police power through zoning to
achieve economic and racial segregation." Davidoff & Davidoff, supra note 23, at 522.
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suburban environment "open and available for citizens of all incomes
and races." 26
C. Judicial Response: The Outsiders Get a Foot in the Door
Among the first cases to deal directly with the problem of exclu-
sionary zoning devices was Board of County Supervisors v. Carper,27
decided in 1959. In that case the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
struck down a two-acre minimum lot size requirement as arbitrary,
unreasonable, and unrelated to the general welfare of the community.
The ordinance failed because of its tendency to channel low-income
groups away from the community. The court overcame the ordinance's
presumption of validity with these remarks:
The practical effect of the [ordinance] is to prevent people in the
low income bracket from living in the western area and forcing
them into the eastern area, thereby reserving the western area for
those who could afford to build houses on two acres or more. This
would serve private rather than public interests. Such an inten-
tional and exclusionary purpose would bear no relation to the
health, safety, morals, prosperity and general welfare.28
In National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment,29 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the Carper
rationale and invalidated a four-acre minimum lot requirement. The
court recognized that the township involved was suffering from the ef-
fects of rapid development of the Philadelphia metropolitan area, but
stated that zoning could not be used "to avoid the increased responsibil-
ities and economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably
bring."30 National Land was the first case unambiguously to acknowl-
edge that parochial zoning had an unacceptable impact on outsider
access to the suburbs.3'
Pennsylvania clarified the thrust of National Land in 1970 by two
decisions which purport to prohibit entirely use of the police power to
26 Id. at 509.
27 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
28 Id. at 661, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
29 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
30 Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610 (footnote omitted). The court stated further that the
interest of current residents in maintaining the status quo was "purely a matter of private
desire which zoning regulation may not be employed to effectuate." Id. at 531, 215 A.2d
at 611. A zoning ordinance could not be used "to prevent the entrance of newcomers in
order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise." Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
31 Carper considered only the exclusionary effect of the ordinance on those already
residing within Fairfax County, Virginia. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va.
653, 662, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1952).
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zone out certain income groups or uses. In Concord Township Appeal32
a two- and three-acre minimum lot size requirement was invalidated.
The township argued that lots of less than two acres would burden ex-
isting sewage facilities. 83 The court felt that the real issue was exclu-
sionary zoning and dismissed the sewage argument as "irrelevant": 3
We once again reaffirm our past authority and refuse to allow the
township to do precisely what we have never permitted-keep out
people, rather than make community improvements.
The implication of our decision in National Land is that com-
munities must deal with the problems of population growth. They
may not refuse to confront the future by adopting zoning regula-
tions that effectively restrict population to near present levels. It is
not for any given township to say who may or may not live within
its confines, while disregarding the interests of the entire area. 35
In a related case, Girsh Appeal,"0 the court held unconstitutional a
township's failure to provide for apartments as part of its zoning
scheme, thus rejecting the traditional view that apartments need not be
provided for in a comprehensive zoning scheme.37
Of course the problem of exclusionary zoning is most pressing in
the urban corridor of the northeastern United States. Even among the
northeastern states, however, only Pennsylvania and New Jersey33
32 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). This case is frequently called Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc.
33 Id. at 471-72, 268 A.2d at 767. Municipalities have sometimes responded to the
new burden-on-facilities problem by requiring as a condition of subdivision approval
that the subdivider supply the necessary public facilities. See generally Lake Intervale
Homes, Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28 (1958); Reid
Dev. Corp. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 31 N.J. Super. 459, 107 A.2d 20 (App.
Div. 1954). This approach, however, may have the exclusionary impact of raising the price
of admission to the subdivision. See note 65 infra.
34 439 Pa. at 472, 268 A.2d at 767.
35 Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768-69 (footnote omitted).
36 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
37 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
Mhe development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of
apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section
for private house purposes; . . . in such sections very often the apartment house
is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and
attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district. More-
over, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering . . .
with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which other-
wise would fall upon the smaller homes .... Under these circumstances, apart-
ment houses.., come very near to being nuisances.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).
38 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (L. Div. 1971) (ordinance invalid for failure to promote reasonably balanced com-
munity).
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courts appear to have taken a strict anti-exclusionary position.3 9 But as
outsider groups elsewhere gather forces they will undoubtedly look to
the Pennsylvania and New Jersey decisions for support.
At this point the vanguard cases stand for at least three key prin-
ciples. First, courts and planners must evaluate local zoning policy in
terms of its effect on access to adequate suburban housing by low- and
moderate-income groups.40 Second, communities cannot shirk their
responsibilities to outsiders. Third, the overall solution to the problem
of exclusionary zoning may be greater regional planning.41 The Penn-
sylvania court's endorsement of regional planning may well be the most
enduring aspect of its Concord and Girsh opinions. 42
In addition to the expanded general welfare and due process
notions utilized by the Pennsylvania courts, equal protection arguments
have been advanced in the law reviews 43 and have made a respectable
39 Some states, however, have attacked the problem of exclusionary zoning through
legislation. In New York, the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) is empowered to
buy and sell land, to give financial assistance to projects aimed at alleviating the inade-
quate supply of low- and moderate-income housing, and to override local laws, including
zoning ordinances, should the UDC find an appropriate site for housing. N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWs §§ 6255, 6266(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971). There is currently a bill pending in the
New York State legislature which would vitiate the UDC's pivotal power. (1972) Sen.
Int. No. 9987 (Comm. on Rules), (1971) Assy. Int. No. 650 (Mr. Suchin) (UDC shall not
initiate any project unless and until it complies with local zoning regulations).
In Massachusetts municipalities have been directed by statute to provide a minimum
amount of vacant land to limited-profit developers for construction of low-income housing.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, § 20 (Supp. 1970). The effect of such legislation has been
minimal:
The Massachusetts legislation in effect legitimizes exclusionary zoning of more
than ninety-nine percent of a local community, and the UDC in New York has
never exercised its power to enter a community against the will of the local
government.
Roberts 37 (footnotes omitted).
40 Industry is moving into the county and region from the central cities. Popu-
lation continues to expand rapidly. New housing is in short supply. Congestion
is worsening under deplorable living conditions in the central cities .... The
ghetto population to an increasing extent is trapped, unable to find or afford ade-
quate housing in the suburbs because of restrictive zoning.
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 17, 283 A.2d 353,
356 (L. Div. 1971); see Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56
CoRNEaL L. REv. 343, 349 n.45 (1971). See also note 47 infra.
41 Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 476, 268 A.2d 765, 769 (1970). In a footnote
to Girsh Appeal, Justice Roberts elaborated:
Perhaps in an ideal world, planning and zoning would be done on a regional
basis, so that a given community would have apartments, while an adjoining
community would not. But as long as we allow zoning to be done community by
community, it is intolerable to allow one municipality (or many municipalities)
to dose its doors at the expense of surrounding communities and the central city.
437 Pa. 237, 245 n.4, 263 A.2d 395, 399 nA (1970) (emphasis in original).
42 Cf. E. ROBERTS, LAND-USE PLANNING: CASES AND MATERIALS 4-151 n.3 (1971).
43 E.g., Sager, supra note 1; Note, supra note 40; Note, Exclusionary Zoning and
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showing in the courts.44 Equal protection is certainly a more intel-
lectually appealing basis than the due process clause for attacking
exclusionary zoning, since outsider interests would be expressly con-
sidered; due process contests usually involve only a municipality and a
landowner seeking to protect his property interests. 45 But there are
serious shortcomings in the exclusive use of equal protection argu-
ments.40 Exclusionary zoning only indirectly discriminates on the basis
of race; its primary discrimination is economic.47 Although discrimina-
tion on the basis of wealth has often been held to violate equal pro-
tection,48 wealth classifications have not yet uniformly been subjected to
the rigid judicial scrutiny that classifications based on race have
received. Indeed, in James v. Valtierra409 the Supreme Court indicated
that unless direct racial discrimination is intended, exclusionary com-
munity land-use procedures and patterns give rise to no equal protection
issues. 50 Similarly, although racial discrimination in housing violates
equal protection, 51 housing itself has never unequivocally been held to
constitute a fundamental interest.5 2
Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. RYv. 1645 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home
Be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L. Rav. 339 (1970).
44 See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F,2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
In these cases local building or zoning codes were found to have a motive of racial dis-
crimination.
45 Sager, supra note 1, at 784-85.
46 See, e.g., Note, 69 MIcE. L. RFv., supra note 43, at 844-47.
47 Within the context of the new suburban city .. . the poor are no longer black;
they are rather every man not a member of the upper middle class....
The real contradiction in American society is that its white, blue collar classes
are being excluded from the new city developing in suburbia. It is not the minor-
ity which is being discriminated against but the majority.
Roberts 39.
48 E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1971); see Note, 69 MxcH. L. R., supra note
43, at 344-47.
49 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
50 In Valtierra the Court reviewed article 34 of the California Constitution, which
provided that before any low-income housing project could be constructed, the people in
the affected area must approve the project by referendum. Since the referendum require-
ment did not rest upon "distinctions based on race," it did not constitute racial discrim-
ination in violation of the equal protection clause. "[O]f course a law-making procedure
that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal protection." Id. at 142.
5' Hunter v. Erickson, 393 US. 885 (1969); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelop-
ment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
52 But see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966): "If we were in a domain exclu-
sively private, we would have different problems. But urban housing is in the public
domain .... Urban housing is dearly marked with the public interest." Id. at 385 (con-
curring opinion). See also Note, supra note 40, at 864.
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D. The Outsider Movement: A Party in Search of a Candidate
Despite the absence of a unifying rationale, the attack on exclu-
sionary zoning continues on all fronts. Public interest groups have
sprouted up to help outsiders plan and litigate.53 The New York Times
devoted a series of articles to the effects of exclusionary zoning on jobs
and housing opportunities.54 Settled practices are being rechallenged;
for example, suit has been filed 55 in Bedminster, New Jersey, challeng-
ing a five-acre minimum lot size requirement that had been upheld in
1952.56 Environmentalists have brought a federal action alleging that
zoning practices of Suffolk County, New York prevent construction of
suburban housing for low-income families.57 A New Jersey superior
court has struck down the entire zoning scheme of a municipality on the
ground that it ignored the "desperate housing needs" of urban New
Jersey.58 A Westchester County planning department study warns
planners that restrictive laws are becoming increasingly vulnerable to
An argument derived from Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)-that exclusion-
ary zoning violates the fundamental right to travel by making it impossible for members
of certain income groups to move to the community of their choice-has also been ad-
vanced. Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents,
23 STAN. L. REv. 774, 792 n.112 (1971). This argument seems somewhat unpromising in
light of (1) the undeveloped state of the right to travel doctrine (see Freiich & Bass,
Exclusionary Zoning: Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 URBAN LAW, 344, 361 (1971)); (2)
the question whether the right extends to intrastate travel at all (see Shapiro v. Thompson,
supra at 630); and (3) the possibility that the "general welfare" purpose of zoning might
constitute a "compelling state interest" sufficient to maintain its constitutionality (id. at
634).
53 For example, the Suburban Action Institute, the National Urban Coalition, and the
National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. See Freilich & Bass, supra note 52,
at 345. See also Bosselman, supra note 7, at 117.
Suburban Action Institute and Mack Construction Corporation, a commercial devel-
oper, recently proposed construction of a limited profit, racially and economically mixed
community on a tract owned by the developer in rural Readington, New Jersey. The In-
stitute's director explained the rationale for the project: "If Readington is prepared to
accept industries, it must be prepared to accept the people who will work in them." N.Y.
Times, Apr. 2, 1972, at 48, col. 7. The proposal is expected to generate litigation. Id., col. 6.
54 N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1971, at 1, col. I; id., Aug. 17, 1971, at 1, col. 2; id., Aug. 16,
1971, at 1, col. 2.
55 Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster, No. L-36896-70 P.W. (N.J. Super.
Ct. Somerset County, filed Aug. 23, 1971).
56 Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952). The ordinance
was upheld as protective of the unspoiled, rustic countryside of Bedminster. See Roberts
14 n.67.
57 Suffolk County Defenders of the Environment, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, No.
70-C-1278 (E.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 9, 1970).
58 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 20, 283
A.2d 353, 358 (L. Div. 1971).
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court challenges.59 In short, the clamor over exclusionary zoning is
reaching a fever pitch which no planning board can safely ignore.
Before it is legislatively6 or judicially imposed on them as an
affirmative duty,01 suburban planners would be well advised to devise
a zoning system which makes some provision for all income groups.6 2
Some mix of disparate housing types and densities, in addition to the
standard single-family residence scheme, should be achieved.63 At the
very least planners will need to demonstrate that their plans neither
discourage nor prohibit the development of low- and moderate-income
housing. To achieve this housing mix without forfeiting the character




A. Time Controls in the Abstract: Raison d'9tre
Many zoning tools control population density and in that way
indirectly accomplish both economic segregation and geographic popu-
lation control. The cost of complying with minimum lot size or floor
space requirements is high65 and often results in low density neighbor-
hoods.
59 Economic Consultants Organization, Inc., Interim Report No. 6: Zoning Ordinances
and Administration, June 1970, at 34-42.
It is doubtful that local zoning, without regard to the needs and pressures of the
larger metropolitan community, can protect a municipality from destructive
change. The solution ... must be found in regulations which not only protect
local interests but advance the interest of the larger community.
Id. at 62.
60 See, e.g., note 89 supra.
61 See Davidoff & Davidoff, supra note 23, at 531-32 n.54; Feiler, Metropolitanization
and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 MIcH. L. Rxv. 655 (1971);
Note, 23 STAN. L. Rav., supra note 52, at 798.
62 "[T]he emerging truth is that no community's land-use plan is valid unless it
programs pluralistic development and unless it includes a government-sponsored program
to produce housing at the lower reaches of the spectrum should market forces prove un-
responsive." Roberts 29 (footnote omitted).
63 "In short, the mixture of housing becomes a constitutional question." Freilich &
Bass, supra note 52, at 365.
64 "[R]egulation rather than prohibition is the appropriate technique for attaining
a balanced and attractive community." Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 265, 181
A.2d 129, 147 (1962) (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed, 371 US. 233 (1963).
65 See, e.g., Johnston, Developments in Land Use Control, 45 NoT DAME LAW. 399,
408 (1970):
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Time controls work a much more equitable result. Rather than
creating "tight little islands" 60 they emphasize controlling both popula-
tion and community growth until the municipality is able to provide
adequate facilities and services. The time control concept contemplates
coordination between the pace of development and its sequence.67
Growth is not only phased; ideally, it is encouraged adjacent to built-up
areas before more remote areas are opened for development. Time
controls are an attempt to assure habitable surroundings and efficient
land use to whoever ultimately occupies the area. Although they do not
inherently ignore either the color of a man's skin or the size of his
pocketbook, time controls can be shaped to operate with a high degree
of neutrality. If a community embraces a bona fide commitment to
sequential development, the capacity for even-handed treatment of all
income groups is readily apparent.6
Equitably fashioned time controls neutralize or eliminate entirely
the need for and abuses resulting from exclusionary devices, without
abandoning the legitimate interest of planners and current residents in
preserving the character and quality of their community. They restore
an equitable aspect to the planning process, respond to the pressures of
outsider groups, and possibly stave off harsh judicial intervention. They
constitute an eminently sensible approach to the problem of metro-
politan growth, reflecting pragmatism and a rough sense of justice to
all parties. If not the ultimate solution, controlled growth may at least
be a needed transitionary approach for bridging the period between
current fragmented, parochial zoning practices69 and the inevitable
regional approach of the future.70
Restricting a community to large single-family residential lots . . . virtually
assures that only expensive houses will be constructed. Similarly, open space,
minimum floor area, and other multifamily dwelling restrictions assure that only
luxury apartments will be economically feasible in the community.
66 Sager, supra note 1.
67 See Clinic: Development Timing, in PLANNING 1955, at, 94-95 (1956) (H. Fagin,
Planning Director, Regional Plan Ass'n, Inc., N.Y.).
68 Although exclusionary zoning is largely motivated by fiscal considerations (see
note 13 supra), the concept of time controls implicitly recognizes that the way to provide
for pluralistic community growth is not to act as if fiscal considerations are unimportant,
but to render them appropriate respect within the regulatory scheme. When fiscal con-
siderations are made explicit in a scheme of controlled growth, judicial review is facili-
tated. See note 95 infra. Even if a court finds that a particular scheme does not meet
constitutional muster, rather than void the entire plan it can merely order it accelerated.
Fiscal considerations expressed in a system of time controls are simply another aspect of
reviewable regulation, rather than a justification for preserving an otherwise exclusionary
scheme. See text accompanying notes 92-95 infra.
69 [F]ragmentation of the zoning power [has] resulted in many of the exclusionary
features of regulation . . . . [I]ndividual units of government [were] relatively
free to employ the zoning power in the provincial interest of the zoning munici-
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B. Time Controls in the Real World: Semantics on the Bench
Use of time controls or a controlled growth concept as the founda-
tion of an overall zoning scheme7' has been pioneered by the Town of
Ramapo, a suburb located thirty miles from New York City. The
approach of the Ramapo scheme is to regulate the sequence and
timing of residential growth in phase with the availability of municipal
services and support facilities.7 2
Judicial response to the plan has been mixed to date. The Rock-
land County, New York supreme court found7 "that on all the grounds
of challenge the ordinance passes muster as a valid exercise of the Town
Board's zoning regulation powers."74 The petitioner's75 main argu-
ments were that the town board had exceeded its delegated zoning
power 6 and had confiscated private property without due process or
compensation 7
palities. Each unit of local government, large or small, was empowered to restrict
the use of land within its borders to achieve objectives which were within the
reach of the police power, with little or no regard for the needs of the broader
community.
Anderson, Symposium-Exclusionary Zoning: Introduction, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465, 467
(1971).
70 Haar, What Are We Learning About Metropolitan Planning?, in PLANNING 1969,
at 33, 44-45 (1969). See also Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: A Legislative Approach, 22
SYRA usE L. REv. 583, 587 (1971).
71 As a theoretical concept, controlled growth had its birth in the mid-1950's. See,
e.g., Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAw & CoNTrrIP. PROB. 298
(1955); Clinic: Development Timing, supra note 67, at 81 (P. Green, Jr., Univ. of North
Carolina). In the days of judicial passivity on zoning matters (see notes 11-16 and accom-
panying text supra) planners had little use for the time control device. Locking a commu-
nity into a capital budget and schedule of improvements (see note 105 infra) probably
seemed unnecessarily rigid to them.
72 Ramapo's plan of controlled growth provides that developers must obtain a special
permit to build for residential purposes and that issuance of a permit depends on the
subdivision area achieving at least 15 "development points." These points are computed
in accordance with the proximity of the proposed subdivision to the essential municipal
services and facilities. The public improvements are to be extended sequentially by the
municipality to all areas of the community over an 18-year period. A developer might
advance the date of permit issuance by providing the improvements himself. Brief for
Appellant at 5-8, Golden v. Planning Bd., appeal docketed, No. 475, N.Y. Ct. App., Nov. 17,
1971. For details of the plan as implemented see note 105 infra.
73 Golden v. Planning Bd., No. 525-1970 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County, Nov. 19,
1970), rev'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 324 N.YS.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1971), appeal docketed,
No. 475, Ct. App., Nov. 17, 1971.
74 Id. at 29.
75 The action was brought by the record owner of a parcel of undeveloped land
known as Golden Estates and by Ramapo Improvement Corp., the owner's contract vendee.
76 For the varied judicial responses to such a position, see text accompanying notes
79 & 82-83 infra.
77 Golden v. Planning Bd., No. 525-1970, at 2 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County, Nov. 19,
1970).
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The ultra vires challenge was that the enabling statutes78 author-
ized efforts to control population density but did not specifically
provide for the Ramapo goal, namely, controlling the rate of popula-
tion growth. Justice Galloway found this apparent disparity a horse
soon curried:
In our judgment the power to so regulate and restrict [density
of population] contains within its grant, not only implicitly but
expressly, the power to control growth, i.e. the control of popula-
tion growth. Obviously the power to regulate the height and bulk
of buildings, the percentage of lot area occupancy, and the density
of population in logic and reasonable construction includes the
power to regulate growth of population .... 79
Justice Galloway also found in the plan neither confiscation without
compensation nor a due process violation.80
In the appellate division, a sharply divided bench reversed
78 N.Y. Town LAw §§ 261, 263 (McKinney 1965). The New York enabling statutes are
virtually exact enactments of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, the model act for
delegation of zoning authority to municipalities. U.S. DEP'T OF COMIERCE, STANDARD STATE
ZONING ENABLING AcT (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as SZEA]. Two sections are espe-
cially relevant to this discussion:
Section 1. Grant of Power.-For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals,
or the general welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities and incor-
porated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number
of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that
may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of
population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade,
industry, residence, or other purposes.
Section 3. Purposes in View.-Such regulations shall be made in accordance with
a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure
safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general wel-
fare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to
avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements.
Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things,
to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and
with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appro-
priate use of land throughout such municipality.
Id. §§ 1, 3 (emphasis added).
79 No. 525-1970, at 18 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County) (emphasis in original).
80 There was no due process violation since the duration of the land-use restriction
was not permanent or unreasonable. Id. at 26. The maximum potential restraint was 18
years, and most areas would be developed sooner. The plan had provisions to ensure that
deferral of beneficial uses would correspond strictly to the preplanned completion dates
for public improvements. Id. at 9. Should the town lag behind schedule, the developer
would be credited with development points and the land qualified for a permit, just as
if the improvements existed. See note 72 supra. Another relief feature was that a developer
could obtain a reduction in the assessed valuation of his land for property tax purposes
to the extent that such valuation could be shown to be affected by temporary use re-
strictions. Id. at 27.
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squarely on the ultra vires grounds.81 Justice Martuscello, speaking for
the majority, contended that Ramapo had "usurped power by regulat-
ing its population growth in a manner which has not been delegated
to it." '82 A town could use its delegated powers to control population
density through minimum lot size requirements, but such a practice
was "clearly distinguishable" from regulating population growth.83 The
court also found that the discrimination among developers inherent in
allowing some "to build earlier than others" 84 could not be relieved
by the tax abatement feature 5 of the Ramapo plan.
The judicial timidity of the appellate division reflects a wooden
view of zoning statutes. Such a view may freeze experimentation with
land-use controls at a time when the insider-outsider struggle urgently
needs a resolution that accommodates both suburban community in-
terests and metropolitan growth.86
81 The appellate division had before it two cases involving the validity of the Ramapo
scheme. Golden v. Planning Bd., 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 324 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1971);
Rockland County Builders Ass'n v. McAlevey, 37 App. Div. 2d 738, 324 N.Y.S.2d 190 (2d
Dep't 1971), appeal docketed, No. 476, Ct. App., Nov. 17, 1971. Two benches of five justices
each heard the two cases, but because of overlapping assignments only eight individual
justices made up the two benches. A headcount reveals that of the eight, only four actu-
ally voted to reverse Justice Galloway. The appellate division decided Golden by a three
to two majority.
82 37 App. Div. 2d at 243, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
83 Id. at 241, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
84 Id. at 243, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
85 See note 80 supra. Justice Hopkins, concurring, felt that the statutory authority for
decreasing the assessment of land (N.Y. GEN. MuNIC. ~IW § 247 (McKinney Supp. 1971))
did not contemplate purposes such as Ramapo's. 37 App. Div. 2d at 245, 324 N.Y.S.2d at
188. The purpose of the authorizing statute is expressly to preserve "open space," defined
in part as areas "whose existing openness, natural condition, or present state of use, if
retained, would enhance the present or potential value of abutting or surrounding urban
development." N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAw § 247(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
Justice Benjamin, dissenting in Rockland County Builders Ass'n v. McAlevey, 37 App.
Div. 2d 738, 324 N.Y.S.2d 190 (2d Dep't 1971), found the tax abatement feature a salutary
aspect of the plan:
... I see no merit in the contention that it constitutes an illegal partial tax ex-
emption. In my view, such reduction of assessment is not a tax exemption at all,
but merely a pragmatic and valid recognition of the fact that the temporary re-
striction on the land has reduced its value during the period of restriction ....
Id. at 741, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
86 Even the appellate division majority seemed to sense this: "I am aware of the po-
sitions of many legal commentators who have suggested that perhaps new types of controls
may be needed to prevent urban sprawl and the problems associated with it." Id. at 243,
324 N.Y.S.2d at 186. Nevertheless, the majority exercised judicial restraint: "[W]hether
there should be such delegation of [the power to zone for controlled growth] is a political
decision to be made by the Legislature." Id. at 244, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 186. For the argument
that ample statutory authority already exists under the relevant SZEA sections, see text
accompanying note 79 supra & notes 87-90 infra.
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C. Time Controls: Legitimate Child of Statutory Interstices
The zoning scheme embodied in the Standard Zoning Enabling
Act, on which New York's enabling legislation is based,87 sets forth a
number of permissible objectives of zoning regulation. Section one
generally authorizes the municipality to regulate land use for the
general welfare.88 Specifically, section one allows the regulation of
population density, a grant of authority that to Justice Galloway en-
compassed the controlled growth concept of the Ramapo plan.8 9
Section three is a statement of the purposes of a zoning scheme; it
should "prevent the overcrowding of land.., avoid undue concentra-
tion of population. . . [and] facilitate the adequate provision of trans-
portation, water, sewerage .... and other public requirements."9 0 Time
controls accomplish these purposes by design,91 and perhaps with
greater efficacy than common zoning devices already authorized under
this enabling legislation.
The appellate division's restrictive reading of New York's enabling
legislation was founded in part on its vague fear that to permit a
municipality to delay growth might deny outsider access to the urban
fringe as effectively as more traditional exclusionary schemes.92 This
concern is not only misplaced; 93 as a matter of statutory interpretation
it is beside the point. Time controls undeniably are subject to exclu-
87 N.Y. TOWN IAW §§ 261, 263 (McKinney 1965). See note 78 supra.
88 Quoted in note 78 supra.
89 See text accompanying note 79 supra. Neither the supreme court nor the appellate
division cited direct authority in support of their opposing interpretations of the New
York enabling statutes. Justice Galloway relied on logic: if control of population density
was allowed, control of population growth must have been contemplated. Golden v. Plan-
ning Bd., No. 525-1970, at 18 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County, Nov. 19, 1970). Justice
Martuscello in the appellate division took a formalistic approach: the statutory language
provided for controlling population density but not controlled population growth. 37 App.
Div. 2d at 24041, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 188-84.
90 N.Y. ToWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 1965).
91 [T]here are at least four legitimate planning bases for controlling the timing
of development and ... these afford both the impetus and the legal justification
for some method of regulation. These . . . are: (1) to economize on the costs of
providing municipal facilities and services and to maintain them at a high quality
level; (2) to retain municipal control over the eventual character of development
by preventing premature and sporadic building in unripe places; (3) to maintain
a desirable degree of balance among various uses of land; and (4) to achieve greater
detail and specificity in development regulation.
Clinic: Development Timing, supra note 67, at 95 (H. Fagin).
92 37 App. Div. 2d at 242, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 185:
It is not difficult to envision the tremendous hardship and chaotic conditions
which may result if many of our up-State municipalities decide to delay the exo-
dus of city residents desirous of leaving their crowded environs and moving into
such up-State rural regions.
93 See notes 96 & 97 and accompanying text infra.
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sionary abuse, just as are many clearly authorized zoning devices.94 But
judicial review should operate to restrict such abuse, not to interpret
restrictively the initial legislative grant of power.05
The radical ring of the words "controlling population growth"
should be of ephemeral shock value once it is realized that not ultimate
population but only the immediate rate of population growth is the
subject of time control regulation. 6 In fact, at the end of the control
period, it is possible that the population of an area regulated by time
controls may be higher than that otherwise resulting from the usual
low-density zoning devices still judicially authorized.97 Time controlled
development may also better conserve the environment since the inci-
dence of speculative, premature development and other indicia of
urban sprawl may be minimized or eliminated.98
04 See note 65 supra; note 95 and accompanying text infra.
05 Judicial review would still be available to correct any abuses in the operation of
a time control scheme. In fact, time controls have internal features that assist judicial
review.
First, a time control scheme involves budgetary commitments and a schedule of cap-
ital improvements. Failure to pursue projects planned on paper (a failure, for example,
to allocate sufficient funds) would be a very visible display of mala fides on the part of
community officials. To remain above suspicion, any time control plan must continuously
demonstrate consistency with its schedule of sequential growth.
A second feature that facilitates judicial scrutiny is that in initially mapping a sched-
ule of growth, the planning board must adopt reasonable time and space limits; it cannot
restrict the development of land for too long a period. See Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v.
Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 29 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969) (rezoning
land to bar multiple dwellings for unlimited period of time held taking of property
without just compensation).
Controlled growth also serves as a safety valve. By installing at his own expense the
necessary public services, a developer may accelerate the date when his land will qualify
for a use permit. See note 72 supra. This feature, perhaps more than the others, indicates
the bona fides of the time controls approach. The concern is only that the land have ade-
quate public improvements before development, not that development never occur.
96 [R]egulating and stunting growth is neither the ultimate objective or effect of
the amendment. The population of the Town at the end of the period of con-
trols and during it will exceed greatly the population which would exist if per-
manent low-density controls were utilized as is permitted under existing zoning
law. The purpose and effect is to increase permanent population, but in sound
well planned stages.
Brief for Appellant at 24, Golden v. Planning Bd., appeal docketed, No. 475, Ct. App.,
Nov. 17, 1971 (emphasis in original).
97 For the built-in growth retarding features of traditional zoning devices, see note 65
and accompanying text supra.
98 Immediate development, uncoordinated with the surroundings and unmindful
of the future carries hidden costs and disruptive second and third order conse-
quences....
Requiring that a minimum level of essential facilities be available before
construction encourages the highest and most appropriate use. Such a require-




Under the Standard Zoning Enabling Act an ultra vires attack
would be even more misguided, since sections one and three are
broadly phrased general delegations of power.9 9 Zoning statutes, more-
over, were originally designed to vest in the municipality the ability to
respond to changing concepts of "general welfare." The Supreme Court
recognized this in Euclid.
Building zone laws are of modern origin .... Until recent
years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great
increase and concentration of population, problems have devel-
oped, and constantly are developing, which require.. . additional
restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands
in urban communities.... Such regulations are sustained, under
the complex conditions of our day .... And in this there is no
inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or con-
tract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation.100
A zoning scheme should leave some room for imagination and flexibil-
ity; the appellate division's invalidation of the Ramapo scheme may
have a chilling effect on advances in land-use planning.
Time controls also meet the standard requirement that zoning
ordinances encourage the most "appropriate use of the land."10 1 Unless
"appropriate" use and "immediate" use are equated, 0 2 requiring a
minimum level of essential services before development may proceed
encourages the most appropriate use of the land. Deferring develop-
ment may not please speculative developers but it avoids the ecological
Brief for Appellant at 31, Golden v. Planning Bd., appeal docketed, No. 475, Ct. App.,
Nov. 17, 1971. See also Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d
424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); note 95 supra.
99 See note 78 supra.
100 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865, 586-87 (1926).
101 SZEA § 3.
102 "One of [the] considerations [in enacting zoning ordinances is] the encouragement
of 'the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.' At bar, however,
the Town of Ramapo prevents the immediate use of land .... Golden v. Planning Bd.,
37 App. Div. 2d 236, 242, 324 N.Y.S.2d 178, 184-85 (2d Dep't 1971), quoting N.Y. TowN
LAw § 263 (McKinney 1965). But see Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 67 Misc. 2d 828, 824
N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (probable inadequacy of water and sewage systems for mul-
tiple dwellings may warrant municipal postponement or elimination of some land uses):
The definition of "public health, safety and welfare" surely must now be broad-
ened to include and to provide for these belatedly recognized threats and hazards
to the public weal. The town's decision . . . would appear to constitute a recog-
nition that it as well as an owner must subordinate immediate to long-term
interests.
Id. at 832, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
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blight and wasteful duplication of municipal facilities which have
accompanied unplanned growth in the past.10 3
A final aspect of time controls which lends them legal respectability
is their close conceptual and practical link with the traditional require-
ment that any scheme of land uses be based upon a "comprehensive
plan" for community development. 0 4 Ramapo clearly made an effort
to anchor its plan to this requirement. 10 5 Relying on Ramapo's thor-
ough planning and bona fide municipal commitment, 06 Justice Gal-
loway found time controls to be fully consonant with the comprehensive
plan standard.1'07 The appellate division at least did not dispute the
genuineness of Ramapo's commitment to controlled growth.
D. Time Controls and Exclusionary Attacks
Obviously the ability of time controls to withstand statutory attack
does not alone make them a valid zoning device; under modem deci-
103 See Comment, supra note 8, at 532.
104 A comprehensive plan for community land use is a condition precedent to the
validity of any zoning ordinance.
The thought behind the [comprehensive plan] requirement is that consideration
must be given to the needs of the community as a whole.... [L]ocal authorities
must act for the benefit of the community as a whole following a calm and de-
liberate consideration of the alternatives . . . .[It] is not a mere technicality
which serves only as an obstacle course for public officials to overcome ....
Rather, the comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be
no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is
being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup
poll.
Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-94 (1968).
See Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. RE.v. 1154 (1955).
105 Major features of the Ramapo plan were (1) a two-year study of the area in co-
operation with federal, state, and county agencies before adopting a master plan; (2) a
comprehensive zoning ordinance to implement the master plan; (3) a capital budget which,
in tandem with a scheduled scheme of capital improvements, committed the town to
bring municipal facilities to all nearby areas within 18 years; (4) preparation of a drainage
plan after a study of the maximum surface water density of the area, and creation of a
sewer district to carry out scheduled construction of sewers to all areas; and (5) creation of a
public housing authority to coordinate construction of federally subsidized housing with
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Brief for Appellant at 5-8, Golden
v. Planning Bd., appeal docketed, No. 475, Ct. App., Nov. 17, 1971.
100 Although it had been argued in the supreme court that there was no assurance
that Ramapo would follow through and appropriate funds beyond the statutorily autho-
rized six-year period, the court found no merit to this contention. No. 525-1970, at 20-21
(Sup. Ct. Rockland County).
107 [The time plan's] obvious purpose is to prevent premature subdivision and
urban development in the absence of a minimum level of adequate municipal and
public improvement and facilities to properly service such residential subdivisions.
Its clear purpose is also [to] ... assure] that the restraints imposed be limited to
a reasonably foreseeable period of time ....




sions they must also be shown not to have an exclusionary effect. An
initial significant distinction between time controls and other zoning
devices that have been voided on exclusionary grounds is that when
the time control device is linked with a bona fide comprehensive plan
and a formula for gradually including low- and moderate-income
housing, the whole scheme takes on an equitable, quasi-regional,108 and
judicially palatable character. Time controls evidence a spirit of bona
fide regulation, not outright exclusion. The Pennsylvania decisions
railed against attempts to "keep out people"'109 and exhorted municipali-
ties to be sensitive to the impact of zoning on outsiders.110 Time
controls comply to the letter. They regulate but do not freeze growth;
and they are flexible enough to accommodate a variety of densities and
housing types."1
A second distinguishing feature is that time controls accord with
the requirement expressed by the Pennsylvania court that "com-
munities must deal with the problems of population growth." 112 Time
controls do not seek to avoid problems of population expansion. They
are prospective and based on projections of future community needs. 118
108 See Freilich & Bass, supra note 52, at 367. Rather than aiming exclusively at the
preservation of property values or other local interests, controlled growth seeks to respond
to regional population pressures. Of course, no single community by itself can solve prob-
lems of regional magnitude. But an accumulation of judicially or legislatively endorsed
time control schemes responding in an ad hoc way to particular regional growth patterns
might well be the best hope in a time when real regional land-use planning is still con-
fined to textbooks. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
109 E.g., Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 474, 268 A.2d 765, 768 (1970).
110 E.g., Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 244-45, 263 A.2d 395, 398-99 (1970). See Washburn,
Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 Dscn. L. REv. 634, 651 (1970):
"The real party in interest in the Girsh case is the future suburban apartment resident."
111 Time controls would also facilitate implementation of flexible zoning techniques
such as "duster" zoning and "floating" zones. These devices can aid a community in meet-
ing the pressures of change without sacrificing the overall goals of habitability and diver-
sity. Cluster zoning promotes the development of closely grouped, self-contained commu-
nities and the preservation of open space between them. The cost of services is reduced,
architectural diversity is encouraged, and recreational use of open space made possible.
See E. RoBERTS, supra note 42, at 6-136 n.4.
Under the floating zone concept a particular use is confined to specifically limited
proportions of community land (e.g., apartment houses on not more than 15% of town
land), but no specific land on which the use will be permitted is identified. When a de-
veloper applies to the planning board to use his land in a particular way, the decision
is made whether, where, and to what extent to exhaust the percentage use limitation. See
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
112 Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 474, 268 A.2d 765, 768 (1970).
313 Despite the appellate division's holding in Golden, the star of long range planning
seems to be on the rise in New York. See, e.g., Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d
221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971) (prospect of future water pollution unless
ample space left between septic tanks in rocky and hilly terrain held to justify upzoning);
Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 67 Misc. 2d 828, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (rezoning
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By their very nature time controls involve background planning and a
long term commitment of capital resources.11 4 Controlled growth is a
bona fide attempt to cope with metropolitan overspill, not to zone
it out." 5
E. Time Controls: A Bridge over Troubled Waters
Time controls used as described render more than lip service to
the needs of those caught up in the centrifugal forces of urban escape." 6
But the controlled growth approach takes a fundamental policy posi-
upheld based on court's "ecological notice" of projected inadequacy of water supply and
sewage disposal systems for anticipated population of multiple dwellings).
114 See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., No. 525-1970, at 14-15 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County,
Nov. 19, 1970).
115 Timed development was indirectly suggested by language in Westwood Forest
Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1969), quoted with approval in Concord. In Westwood the New York Court of Appeals
had some free legal advice for planners:
This is not to say that the village may not ... impose other restrictions or
conditions on the granting of a building permit to plaintiff, such as a general
assessment for reconstruction of the sewage system, granting of building permits
for the planned garden apartment complex in stages, or perhaps even a morato-
rium on the issuance of any building permits, reasonably limited as to time.
23 N.Y.2d at 428-29, 244 N.E.2d at 702-03, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 133 (emphasis added). The
moratorium device alluded to is essentially similar to time controls.
The National Committee on Urban Growth Policy elaborates on this theme:
Vacant land is the basic national resource for dealing with growth; urbanization
is the filling of land with all of the facilities needed for the people who make up
the population projections. The influencing of growth means influencing what
happens to vacant land in the places where these people will live. It also means,
in some cases, holding land from development as open space or for future use;
and preventing the waste of land through development that is haphazard and
unplanned.
NATIONAL Comma. ON URBAN GROWTH PoLicy, THE NEW Crry 113 (D. Canty ed. 1969). The
use of such techniques as large lot zoning as a timing device
has all too often resulted in scattered development on large lots, prematurely es-
tablishing the character of much later development-the very effect sought to be
avoided. New types of controls are needed if the basic metropolitan scale problems
are to be solved.
NATIONAL COM'N ON URBAN PROaLEMS, supra note 13, at 245.
116 Quaere whether or not this "escape" might not be of the frying pan-into-the-fire
variety. "The brightness of the [suburban] dream has been shadowed by new variants of
old city torments. Residents troubled by traffic, race, crime, drugs, even pollution, have
found it is not so easy to escape the old America." Rosenthal, Columbia, Md.-A Tale of
One City, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 16. Professor Roberts also ques-
tions the quality of suburban existence:
[S]hould the suburbanite escape both drought and disease, he must participate in
the daily ritual of the trip into center-city to work. The notion that every workday
sees the migration of 1,600,000 persons onto [sic] Manhattan . . . staggers the
imagination. This spectacle of the madding crowd seems more reminiscent of a
teeming and frantic Asian city than of the television stereotype of the well ad-justed and self-contained hamlets inhabited by the likes of Patty Duke.
Roberts, From Common Law Logic-Chopper to Land-Use Planner: Eulogy for the Lawyer
as Social Engineer, 53 CORNELL L. Rav. 957, 983 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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tion that the stake of present residents in the community will not be
abandoned. Time controls are designed to supply both a measure of
protection for land values and stability in land uses.117 By phasing
growth and the provision of quality municipal services, community
residents are instituting a kind of built-in community "quality con-
trol" system. This judicious and efficient use of the land redounds to
the benefit of outsiders and insiders alike. The community may be less
likely to succumb to the "backsliding" phenomenon 118 and outsiders
correspondingly will not be robbed of the advantages of suburbia after
fighting tooth and nail to get there.
To be sure, the controlled growth approach does not solve all the
pressing problems of suburban growth clamoring for community atten-
tion and dollars. Nor is there a guarantee that gearing development to
the capacity of the land to support it will successfully avoid all of the
unpredictable housing problems that lie ahead.19 The great strength
of time controls is that they deal with the future as it appears now,
while retaining enough flexibility to adjust to a different world view
117 Such goals are in part embodied in all zoning schemes:
It seems reasonable to conclude that classic Euclidian zoning, in concert with
subdivision controls and other restrictions, may have minimized the hazards of
unrestricted development. Such regulation may have muted the impact of incom-
patible use, and it may have had some tendency to protect the quality of resi-
dential neighborhoods. Zoning may have enjoyed some success in promoting the
more efficient use of commercial districts and preserving prime land for industrial
sites; and it may also have made some aesthetic contribution to the development
of urban communities.
Anderson, supra note 69, at 465-66.
See also E. ROBERTS, supra note 42, at 3-51 to 3-52, where the author identifies one
very specific beneficial effect of zoning:
Lest anyone decide that zoning was a total disaster, let him pause to reflect
upon the real world. Was it not the best reform of laissez-faire dog-eat-dog that
was possible all things considered in light of the times? In addition, did not
zoning improve the chances for housing of innumerable lower-middle class people
who would not otherwise have had the chance to own their own home? ... Put
another way, zoning serves as an insurance device to assure lenders against "en-
vironmental depreciation" which might undercut their security syndrome.
118 "Placing housing projects in the suburbs might even have the disastrous effect
of creating suburban ghettos. Property immediately surrounding the project would
then decline in value, thereby starting the slow trend to blight." Note, supra note 1, at
131-32.
119 There are obstacles to a decent home for all Americans that have nothing to do
with exclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Williams & Norman 475 n.2:
Costs have been rising for all three major factors in housing construction-the
cost of labor and materials, the cost of borrowing money, and the cost of land.
Under these circumstances, a successful program for low- and moderate-income
housing of course requires much more than making land available.
See also Bentley & Macbeth, Mortgage Lenders and the Housing Supply, 57 CoEmis. L.
REv. 149 n.3 (1972): "Increases in cost of materials and labor may . . . price the final
product beyond the reach of many Americans ... .
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should the need arise.120 Any plan of controlled growth can be altered
or accelerated as legal or practical conditions dictate. The most remote
Ramapo time horizon was eighteen years, a horizon subject to accelera-
tion by private developers if they chose to invest heavily in the growth
of the community.121 A controlled growth plan might take on added
respectability, however, and unequivocally demonstrate the bona fides
of the town planners, if it provided for self-acceleration in the case of
unforeseen population pressure, an increase in financial resources, or
advances in the technology of housing construction. Acceleration of
time horizons, either by private initiative or planner response to
unforeseen circumstances, is only one example of the flexibility of time
controls.
CONCLUSION
Much of the flexibility that commends a scheme of controlled
growth could of course also be achieved by regional planning. Al-
though there is general agreement that regional planning is an idea
whose time has come,'122 its midwife unfortunately is metropolitan
intergovernmental cooperation. 123 Until regional planning becomes
more than an academician's fiction, time controls offer a beneficial
interim method to harness the complex forces behind community
growth and to promote land use at rational levels of density.
Thomas C. O'Keefe
120 Because controlled growth development is subject to time and space parameters,
policy changes on the basis of new perceptions or subsequent experimentation can be
successfully integrated into the overall framework of growth. With standard zoning de-
vices, these same adjustments would more likely be piecemeal and haphazard.
121 The Ramapo plan allows the developer, by installing services and facilities at his
own expense, to qualify his land for development earlier than scheduled. See note 72
supra. If town planners desire plan acceleration, municipal subsidies might be used to
induce development, for example by providing leases of municipal equipment, supplying
municipal personnel, or granting property tax credits for municipal improvements made
by the developer.
122 In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced community, a municipal-
ity must not ignore housing needs, that is, its fair proportion of the obligation to
meet the housing needs of its own population and of the region. Housing needs
are encompassed within the general welfare. The general welfare does not stop
at each municipal boundary.
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 NJ. Super. 11, 20, 283 A.2d 353,
358 (L. Div. 1971). See also notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
123 See J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE MTRnoPoLs 429-30 (2d ed. 1970).
